Organizational choices of banks and the effective supervision of transnational financial institutions : [Version: 19 Juli 2012]

This paper outlines relatively easy to implement reforms for the supervision of transnational banking-groups in the E.U. that should not be primarily based on legal form but on the actual risk structures of the pertinent financial institutions. The proposal also aims at paying close attention to the economics of public administration and international relations in allocating competences among national and supranational supervisory bodies. Before detailing the own proposition, this paper looks into the relationship between sovereign debt and banking crises that drive regulatory reactions to the financial turmoil in the Euro area. These initiatives inter alia affirm effective prudential supervision as a pivotal element of crisis prevention. In order to arrive at a more informed idea, which determinants apart from a perceived appetite for regulatory arbitrage drive banks’ organizational choices, this paper scrutinizes the merits of either a branch or subsidiary structure for the cross-border business of financial institutions. In doing so, it also considers the policy-makers perspective. The analysis shows that no one size fits all organizational structure is available and concludes that banks’ choices should generally not be second-guessed, particularly because they are subject to (some) market discipline. The analysis proceeds with describing and evaluating how competences in prudential supervision are currently allocated among national and supranational supervisory authorities. In order to assess the findings the appraisal adopts insights form the economics of public administration and international relations. It argues that the supervisory architecture has to be more aligned with bureaucrats’ incentives and that inefficient requirements to cooperate and share information should be reduced. Contrary to a widespread perception, shifting responsibility to a supranational authority cannot solve all the problems identified. Resting on these foundations, the last part of this paper finally sketches an alternative solution that dwells on far-reaching mutual recognition of national supervisory regimes and allocates competences in line with supervisors’ incentives and the risk inherent in crossborder banking groups

The Single Supervisory Mechanism – Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? : Preliminary assessments of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with the ECB involvement (August 16, 2013)

This paper analyzes the evolving architecture for the prudential supervision of banks in the euro area. It is primarily concerned with the likely effectiveness of the SSM as a regime that intends to bolster financial stability in the steady state. By using insights from the political economy of bureaucracy it finds that the SSM is overly focused on sharp tools to discipline captured national supervisors and thus under-incentives their top-level personnel to voluntarily contribute to rigid supervision. The success of the SSM in this regard will hinge on establishing a common supervisory culture that provides positive incentives for national supervisors. In this regard, the internal decision making structure of the ECB in supervisory matters provides some integrative elements. Yet, the complex procedures also impede swift decision making and do not solve the problem adequately. Ultimately, a careful design and animation of the ECB-defined supervisory framework and the development of inter-agency career opportunities will be critical. The ECB will become a de facto standard setter that competes with the EBA. A likely standoff in the EBA’s Board of Supervisors will lead to a growing gap in regulatory integration between SSM-participants and other EU Member States. Joining the SSM as a non-euro area Member State is unattractive because the cur-rent legal framework grants no voting rights in the ECB’s ultimate decision making body. It also does not supply a credible commitment opportunity for Member States who seek to bond to high quality supervision

The Single Supervisory Mechanism - Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation? : preliminary assessment of the evolving regime for the prudential supervision of banks with ECB involvement : [Version: 16 August 2013]

This paper analyzes the evolving architecture for the prudential supervision of banks in the euro area. It is primarily concerned with the likely effectiveness of the SSM as a regime that intends to bolster financial stability in the steady state. By using insights from the political economy of bureaucracy it finds that the SSM is overly focused on sharp tools to discipline captured national supervisors and thus underincentives their top-level personnel to voluntarily contribute to rigid supervision. The success of the SSM in this regard will hinge on establishing a common supervisory culture that provides positive incentives for national supervisors. In this regard, the internal decision making structure of the ECB in supervisory matters provides some integrative elements. Yet, the complex procedures also impede swift decision making and do not solve the problem adequately. Ultimately, a careful design and animation of the ECB-defined supervisory framework and the development of inter-agency career opportunities will be critical. The ECB will become a de facto standard setter that competes with the EBA. A likely standoff in the EBA’s Board of Supervisors will lead to a growing gap in regulatory integration between SSM-participants and other EU Member States. Joining the SSM as a non-euro area Member State is unattractive because the current legal framework grants no voting rights in the ECB’s ultimate decision making body. It also does not supply a credible commitment opportunity for Member States who seek to bond to high quality supervision

Konzernverantwortung in der aufsichtsunterworfenen Finanzbranche : [Version 28 März 2013]

Das Banken- und Versicherungsaufsichtsrecht benennt an mehreren Stellen ausdrücklich gruppenbezogene Pflichten des übergeordneten Unternehmens. Deren Realisierbarkeit hängt von gesellschafts-, insbesondere konzernrechtlichen Schranken ab, die für die Einflussnahme auf nachgeordnete Gruppenunternehmen bestehen. Der vorliegende Beitrag betrachtet das Zusammenspiel von Aufsichts- und Gesellschaftsrecht unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der regelungstragenden Ziele des ersteren. Die Gruppenverantwortung ist in dieser Sicht ein Institut, das zur Verwirklichung eines klar umrissenen, öffentlichen Interesses an der Befolgung bestimmter Normen das übergeordnete Unternehmen als interne Kontrollinstanz in die Pflicht nimmt und mit gruppendimensionalen Handlungspflichten belegt. Zur Gewährleistung der Effektivität dieses Instituts ist ein sektoral begrenzter Vorrang der aufsichtsrechtlichen Vorgaben anzuerkennen. Dieser ist durch die angemessene Berücksichtigung des mit dem Aufsichtsrecht verfolgten, öffentlichen Interesses als normativer Determinante der Leitungstätigkeit aller gruppenangehörigen Institute zu verwirklichen

Der einheitliche Abwicklungsmechanismus – Europäisches Allheilmittel oder weiße Salbe?

Um den Teufelskreis sich wechselseitig verstärkender Banken- und Staatsschuldenkrisen zu durchbrechen, haben sich die europäischen Institutionen grundsätzlich dazu bekannt, eine Bankenunion zu schaffen. Der Dreh- und Angelpunkt der verfolgten Strategie liegt dabei darin, durch die Schaffung zentraler, d.h. supranationaler Auffangmechanismen die Ausfallrisiken von Banken und Staaten nachhaltig zu entkoppeln. Dabei ist zu beachten, dass gerade auch die einzelnen Elemente des institutionellen Reformpakets in ihrer Binnenstruktur so beschaffen sein müssen, dass vorhersehbare Ineffizienzen nicht dazu führen, dass Vorteile der Supranationalisierung aufgehoben oder gar in ihr Gegenteil verkehrt werden. Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert den Verordnungsentwurf der EU Kommission für einen Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) vor dem Hintergrund dieser Forderung

Effectiveness and safety of opicapone in Parkinson’s disease patients with motor fluctuations: the OPTIPARK open-label study

Background The efficacy and safety of opicapone, a once-daily catechol-O-methyltransferase inhibitor, have been established in two large randomized, placebo-controlled, multinational pivotal trials. Still, clinical evidence from routine practice is needed to complement the data from the pivotal trials. Methods OPTIPARK (NCT02847442) was a prospective, open-label, single-arm trial conducted in Germany and the UK under clinical practice conditions. Patients with Parkinson’s disease and motor fluctuations were treated with opicapone 50 mg for 3 (Germany) or 6 (UK) months in addition to their current levodopa and other antiparkinsonian treatments. The primary endpoint was the Clinician’s Global Impression of Change (CGI-C) after 3 months. Secondary assessments included Patient Global Impressions of Change (PGI-C), the Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS), Parkinson’s Disease Questionnaire (PDQ-8), and the Non-Motor Symptoms Scale (NMSS). Safety assessments included evaluation of treatment-emergent adverse events (TEAEs) and serious adverse events (SAEs). Results Of the 506 patients enrolled, 495 (97.8%) took at least one dose of opicapone. Of these, 393 (79.4%) patients completed 3 months of treatment. Overall, 71.3 and 76.9% of patients experienced any improvement on CGI-C and PGI-C after 3 months, respectively (full analysis set). At 6 months, for UK subgroup only (n = 95), 85.3% of patients were judged by investigators as improved since commencing treatment. UPDRS scores at 3 months showed statistically significant improvements in activities of daily living during OFF (mean ± SD change from baseline: − 3.0 ± 4.6, p < 0.0001) and motor scores during ON (− 4.6 ± 8.1, p < 0.0001). The mean ± SD improvements of − 3.4 ± 12.8 points for PDQ-8 and -6.8 ± 19.7 points for NMSS were statistically significant versus baseline (both p < 0.0001). Most of TEAEs (94.8% of events) were of mild or moderate intensity. TEAEs considered to be at least possibly related to opicapone were reported for 45.1% of patients, with dyskinesia (11.5%) and dry mouth (6.5%) being the most frequently reported. Serious TEAEs considered at least possibly related to opicapone were reported for 1.4% of patients. Conclusions Opicapone 50 mg was effective and generally well-tolerated in PD patients with motor fluctuations treated in clinical practice. Trial registration Registered in July 2016 at clinicaltrials.gov (NCT02847442)